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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Mr. Tortolano's successive

petition's for post-conviction relief (hereinafter referred to second and third
petitions) and judgments (#41551, R., pp.109-110; pp. 120-121; #41552 R., pp. 3435; p.45.) The order of dismissal of the third petition should be reversed becuase
the district court wrongly applied the respondent's motion for summary dismissal
of Tortolano's third petition, the respondent failed to file an Answer setting
any affirmative defenses, when the petition raised a genuine issue of material
fact - specifically newly discovered evidence showing prosecutorial misconduct
that was just discovered by Tortolano due to a prosecution witness coming forward
with information that Tortolano had no
B.

knowledge to until know.

General Course of Proceedings in this and Related Cases
1.

Underlying criminal proceedings

In October 2002, Mr. Tortolano was charged with Murder in the Second Degree.
Tortolano entered a plea of not guilty and was afforded the right to a jury trial
that began in April 2003. On May 9, 2003 the jury returned a verdict of guilty
for Murder in the Second Degree. Tortolano was sentenced in August 2003 and the
judgment of conviction was filed in the court record on September 4, 2003. Mr.
Tortolano then sought a reduction of his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35, which
was denied. Tortolano also filed an appeal from his conviction to the Idaho
Supreme Court, S.Ct. No. 30089, which the Court affirmed the criminal conviction
in an opinion dated June 12, 2006. The Remittitur for the appeal was filed
December 15, 2006.

2

2.

Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

On August 14, 2007, Mr. Tortolano filed a post-conviction relief alleging,
among other things, ineffective assistance of trial counsel in Ada County case
CV-PC-2007-14552. In October 2009, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the allegations raised by Tortolano and both the Petitioner and
Respondent were afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of his
claims. On November 7, 2008 the district court entered an order denying Tortolano's
petition and dismissing the petition. Tortolano filed an appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court, S.Ct. No. 35987. The Idaho Court of Appeals on July 26, 2010,
issued

its 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 563, affirming the district courts

judgment denying post-conviction relief. Tortolano sought a Petition for Rehearing
which was denied, then sought a Petition for Review with the Idaho Supreme Court
which was denied on September 28, 2010, a Remittitur was issued on October 4,
2010.
On June 28, 2012, Mr. Tortolano filed a second petition for post-conviction
relief - almost 18 months after the remittiture finally determining his apepal
from his first petition was finalized accompanied with several several Affidavits
that were attached as Exhibits. (#41551, R.,pp.5-18.) Tortolano alleged five claims
pertaining to trial counsel's ineffectiveness (#41551, R., p.8) and three claims
of first post-conviction relief counsel being ineffective (#41551, R., pp.8-9.)
Additionally Tortolano submitted an amended petition which supplemented additional
claims against trial counsel and first post-conviction relief counsel (#41551,
R., pp.46-48.)

Tortolano also submitted a Motion and Affidavit for Appointment

of Counsel which the district court granted (#41551, R., pp.27-32) and a
Substitution of Conflict Counsel was filed (#41551, R., pp.35-36.)
3

On October 17, 2012 Respondent filed an Answer to Tortolano's second petition
setting forth the affirmative defenses that it was a successive petition and barred
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4908(a). (#41551, R., pp.51-52) and also submitted
its Answer to the Amended Petition (#41551, R., pp.54-55) asserting the same
affirmative defense as the previous one.
On November 20, 2012, Tortolano's counsel and counsel for respondent met with
the district court in a status conference hearing in where Tortolano's counsel
requested thirty (30) days to file a Second Amended Petition if necessary, which
the district court granted, giving Tortolano's counsel until December 20, 2012
to file a second amended petition (#41551, R., pp.59-60.) Over a four (4) month
period from the time the district court granted Tortolano's counsel to file a
second amended petition, counsel for Tortolano filed three motions to extend the
time for filing the second amended petition, which respondent stipulated to and
the district court granted #(41551, R., pp.61-73.) On June 7, 2013 counsel for
Tortolano filed a notice of non-filing of amended petition for post-conviction
relief informing the respondent and the district court that he would not be filing
a second amended petition but rather proceed forward with the second petition that
was filed on June 28, 2012 (#41551, R., pp.74-75.)
On July 3, 2013, counsel for respondent filed its Memorandum In Support of
Motion for Summary Disposition of Second Successive Petition and/or Motion to
Dismiss (#41551, R., pp.77-99) in where four (4) issues were presented as to why
the matter should be dismissed (#41551, R., p.79.) A Notice of Hearing was filed
by respondent on July 16, 2013 setting the matter of the motion for summary
disposition of the second petition and/or motion to dismiss for September 4, 2013.
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In the meantime, Mr. Tortolano filed a thrid "Verified Petition for PostConviction Relief" with the district court setting forth a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim in that trial attorneys failed to challenge the
prosecutor's opening statement to the jury in that a witness Fred Latham would
be called to provide incriminating testimony that Tortolano was planing on killing
the victim. Tortolano based this claim upon newly discovered evidence and provided
a Affidavit that Mr. Latham had signed July 26, 2013, with the filing of the thrid
petition taking place 12 days after the newly discovered evidence was obtained.
(#41552, R., pp.3-11.)
In conjunction with filing of the Third Petition, Tortolano also requested
the court to appoint counsel by submitting a Motion and Affidavit in Support for
Appointment of Counsel (#41552, R., pp.20-22) in which the district court granted
by appinting the Ada County Public Defender or Conflict Counsel (#41552, R., p.24.)
Randall S. Barnum, Counsel in Tortolano's second petition that was also pending
before the district court filed a Substitution of Counsel in the matter (#41552,
R., pp.30-31.)
Respondent, rather than filing an Answer to the Thrid Petition, filed a Motion
for Summary Dismissal of Third Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(#41552, R. pp.25-27) requesting that it be dismissed due to the pending second
petition, and that it is nothing more than an inappropriate attempt to file
additinal motions relating to the second pending petition before the district
court prose and without advise of counsel and lastly that it was beyond the
scope of I.C. 19-4901, et. al. with the district court lacking the authority to
hear/adjudicate the claim set forth in the third petition (#41552, R., pp.25-26.)
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Respondent also filed a Notice of Hearing setting forth September 4, 2013
for the Motion to Dismiss (#41552, R., p.28) and then again a second notice
was filed setting the matter for October 15, 2014, in where the respondents motions
to dismiss both the second and third petitions would be heard (#41552, R., p.34.)
Mr. Tortolano, through counsel submitted an Affidavit in support of his second
petition for post-conviction relief setting to support the Claims he had set forth
in his Second Petition prior to the October 15th hearing that was set before the
district corut (#41551, R., pp.102-108.)
A hearing for the respondent's two motions to dismiss was taken up before
the district court on October 15, 2013, in where the respondent presented argument
in respects to the second post-conviction petition that it was untimely and should
be dismissed (#41551, Tr., pp.4-12, Ln.1-25, 1-16) and then with respects to the
third petition for post-conviction relief as well (#41552, Tr., pp.12-14, Ln. 125, 1-13.)
The district court then gave Mr. Tortolano's counsel an opportunity to be
heard in respects to both the second and third petitions. (#41551, #41552, Tr.,
p.14, Ln.14-15.)

In respects to the second petition, Tortolano's counsel, had

had agreed "that there's not a specific indication as to the lapse of time between
the remittitur on the last last post-conviction and the filing of the second
petition for post-conviction relief". (#41551, Tr., p.16, Ln.17-21.)
As to Tortolano's third petition which contained newly discovered evidence
Counsel for Tortolano argued that the context of the affidavit of Fred Latham it
was fair to conclude that it was newly discovered evidence based on fact, opposed
to law. (#41552, Tr., pp.15-16, Ln.1-25, 1-4) and in addition that the burden
was upon the respondent to prove that it was not newly discovered evidence. (#41552,
6

Tr., p.17, Ln.16-17.)
The district court after hearing arguments in respects to the second and third
petitions for post-conviction relief determined in respects to the second petition
that it seemed to do nothing more than seek to relitigate issues that either were
or should have been fully litigated during the hearing on his first post-conviction
petition, and granted the states motion to dismiss. (#41551, Tr., pp.17-18, Ln.,
22-25; R., pp.109-110.)
In respects to Tortolano's third petition, the district court having determined
the contention that there is newly discovered evidence, and having appeared if
that were evidence that would support relief under the post-conviction relief
statute, it is not newly discovered evidence that would make out a claim that would
entitle Tortolano any relief, and the second successive petition for post-conviction
relief was similarly dismissed summarily on the respondents motion to dismiss.
#41552, Tr., pp.18-19, Ln.12-25, 1-3; R., pp.34-35.)
These two appeals followed. (#41551, R., pp.111-115; #41552, R., pp.36-40.)
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the District Court exercised an abuse of discretion in dismissing
the Second Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief when its issues were
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established
State and Federal Law, as determined by the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of the United States:
A.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing
Tortolano's Second Successive Petition which was not pursuant to a
clear, consistently applied well-established state procedural rule.

B.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing
Tortolano's newly discovered evidence claim without an evidentiary
hearing for it raised a genuine issue of material facts regarding
prosecutorial misconduct,and ineffective of assistance of trial
counsel.

C.

Tortolano was deprived of effective assistance of counsel on collateral
review of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel claim presented
in the second successive petition for post-conviction relief that was
contrary to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.
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IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
An application for post-conviction relief under I.C. §19-4901 is civil in

nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action
which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App.1984). In
order to prevail in a post conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove by
perponderance of the evidence the allegations upon which the request for postconviction relief is based. Id.
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under
I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759
(Ct. App.1991). Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed true
for the purposes of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be held.
Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 84 (Ct. App.1994). If the allegations do not frame
a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily
dismiss, but if the application raises a material fact, the district court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.
After summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, the
reviewing court exercises free and independent review of the district court's
application of law, including constitutional issues. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho
558, 561 (2006).

II
II
II
II
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B.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing
Tortolano's Second Successive Petition which was not pursuant to a
clear, consistently applied well-established rule.
1.

Facts pertaining to argument

On August 8, 2013, Mr. Tortolano filed a verified prose petition for postconviction relief setting forth two claims for relief, ineffective assistance of
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, both related to newly discovered factual
evidence offered by affidavit from a prosecution witness. (#41552, R., pp. 3-11.)
This exhibit, an Affidavit of Fred Lathum, presented newly discovered evidence
with respect to facts that Tortolano did not have an opportunity to otherwise
learn of these particular facts other than speaking with Mr. Latham years after
the trial had taken place.
The respondent had moved for summary dismissal on August 20, 2013, on lieu
of filing an Answer pursuant to I.C.

§ 19-4906(a). (#41552, pp. 25-26.) Respondent

asserted in the motion that Tortolano was attempting to do nothing more than
attempt to file additional motions relating to a previous successive petition for
post-conviction relief that was currently pending before the district court for
its consideration. (See, #41551, sic passim.)
The district court on August 11, 2013, having determined that Tortolano had
set forth claims for post-conviction which a reasonable person would pursue
appointed counsel to represent him (#41552, R., p. 24) with a substitution of
counsel being filed by conflict attorney assigned to the case who subsequently
was already representing Tortolano in the first successive petition. (#41552, R.,
p. 30-31.)
Respondent on September 4, 2014, field a Notice of Hearing setting the matters
pending in the second successive petition for October 15, 2013, which was also
10

which was also the same date for a hearing on the motion to dismiss respondent
had filed in the first successive petition (#41551, R., pp.107-108.)
The district court on October 15, 201J, held a hearing on respondents'
motion to dismiss for both successive petitions. Respondent in respects to the
second successive petition presented oral argument without making any submissions
of the underlying criminal records in the matter concerning the newly discovered
evidence that Tortolano had presented regarding Fred Latham's Affidavit he had
submitted as part of his second successive petition. Tortolano's counsel argued
that it was newly discovered evidence and also pointed out the burden remains
upon the respondent to disprove the facts and evidence presented. (#41552, Tr.,
pp. 12-17, Ln., 17-25, 1-21.)
The district court having heard arguments on the matter ruled that the
newly discovered evidence, if it were evidence that would support relief under
the post-conviction relief statute, is not newly discovered evidence and would
not make out a clam that would entitled Tortolano to relief, and issued an Order
of Dismissal of Petitioners' Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (#41552, Tr.,
pp. 17-19, Ln., 22-25, 1-11; R., pp. 34-35.)
2.

Why relief should be granted

Mr. Tortolano presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding newly
discovered evidence that demonstrated ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct. (#41552, R., pp. 8-11.)
Upon respondent receiving the second successive petition was required by
statute, I.C. § 19-4906(a), and Rule 8, I.R.C.P., to file an Answer to Tortolano's
petition within "30 days after the docketing of the application, ••• respond by
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answer or by motion which may be supported by affidavits." I.C. 19-4906(a).
In addition to following the mandates of I.C. 19-4906(a), respondent in its answer
or motion under Rule 8(c), IRCP, was required to set forth its affirmative
defenses.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, and within it
boot-strapped it to the proceedings in the first successive petition when it
was required under Rule 8(c) to set forth its affirmative defenses. Here, the
respondent failed to do this.
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(a) provides that if the record of the underlying
criminal case is not filed with the petition, that the respondent is required
to file the record -- or such relevant portions of the record -- with the court
with Respondent's Answer. See: Roman v. State, 873 P.2d 898, 902 n.3 (Ct.App.
1994). Respondent has provided neither portions of or the entire underlying
criminal record nor an Answer and therefore have failed to comply with the
mandates of I.C. 19-4906(a) and Rule 8(c) regarding any affirmative defense that
may have been presented.
Here, in the hearing that the district court conducted regarding the
motion to dismiss, counsel for respondent avered to the fact that the statements
made by Mr. Lathem were not true and that she "had to go back and refresh [her]
recollection." (#41522, Tr., pp. 12-13, Ln.21-25, 1-5.) Since the respondent
submitted no evidence to controvert Tortolano's factual assertions that were
set froth in the second successive petition (#41552, R., pp.3-11), the facts are
undisputed. The district court's summary dismissal order was predicated upon
its conclusion that Tortolano' s claims were not newly discovered. , _: _ . __ _
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Mr. Tortolano presented newly discovered evidence in which the respondent
failed to support its motion to dismiss with portions, or the entire, underlying
criminal record, in order to permit Tortolano a full and fair opportunity to
respond properly to the motion to dismiss. Nor was a properly filed Answer done
in accordance with I.C. 19-4906(a). Since the respondent submitted no evidence
to controvert Tortolano's factual assertions, the facts are undisputed. In
evaluating post-conviction claims for summary dismissal, this court assumes the
truth of the applicant's allegations of fact. Martinez v. State, 944 P.2d 127,
139-40 (Ct.App. 1997); Martinez v. Klauser, 266 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2001) in
where the Ninth Circuit held that the dismissal of the petition was not pursuant
to a clear, consistently applied, and well-established state procedural rule.
Mr. Tortolano presented newly discovered evidence in his petition which
shifted the burden of proof to the respondent who in turn failed to follow proper
procedures in setting forth an affirmative defense by submitting portions of the
underlying criminal record to support the dismiss. As such, the district court
erred in dismissing the petition and the Order must be vacated with remand and
instructions to remedy the error.
For the reasons set forth above it is requested the Court reverse the district
court's order of dismissal of the second successive petition for post-conviction
relief and remand for further proceedings.

II
II
II
II
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C.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing
Tortolano's newly discovered evidence claims without an evidentiary
hearing for it raised a genuine issue of material facts regarding
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
1.

Facts pertaining to argument

It was alleged in the second successive petition for post-conviction petition,
with an Affidavit of Fred Latham, to support his claims that prosecutorial
misconduct occurred when the prosecution made in its opening statement to the jury
that they would hear testimony from Mr. Latham that Mr. Tortolano had told
Latham the he was planning on killing Penny and that trial attorney's failed to
challenge the respondents statement. (#41552, R., pp. 5-6; 8-11.)
The remainder of the facts pertaining to this issue are incorporated herein
from the previous issue, "B. 1. Facts pertaining to argument" as if restated in
its entirety.
2.

Why relief should be granted

The district court incorrectly applied the law in granting respondents motion
to dismiss by stating that it was not newly discovered evidence that would make
out a claim that would entitle him to relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Relief Act ("UPCPA") and is contrary to well related cases that derive the
newly discovered exception and discovery exception from the language of Idaho
Code 19-4908, which is incorrect. The proper analysis for the court would have
been to conclude the "discovery exception" is correctly applicable under Idaho
Code 19-4902 when considering "newly discovered evidence" concerning Brady claims.
a.

Idaho's UPCPA is a unitary act that must be construed as a whole

The proper use of Idaho's UPCPA is to protect the petitioner's constitutional
rights. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). The UPCPA
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is a unitary body of laws governing the procedure and manner in which a person
may seek relief after a conviction has been entered. Ibid. As such, the limitation
period set forth in Idaho Code Section 19-4902 controls, whether the petitioner
is filing a first petition or a successive petition thereto.
A court must construe a statute as a whole and consider all sections of the
applicable statue together to determine the intent of the legislature. Herman v.
Blaine County Bd. of Com'rs Acting as Blain County Bd. of Equalization, 126 Idaho
970, 971, 895 P.2d 571, 572 (1995) (citing Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125
Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994)). A construing court's primary duty
is to give effect to the legislative intent and the policy and purpose underlying
statute. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336-37, 870 P.2d 1295-96. It is incumbent that upon
the court to give the statute an interpretation that will not deprive it of its
potency. Id.

b.

The I.C. §19-4902 statue of limitations applies to legitimate Brady
claims running from the date of discovery of the Brady violation

Idaho Code 19-4902 permits consideration of a successive petition for postconviction relief where the court "finds a ground for relief asserted
successive application

in a

which for sufficient reason was asserted or was

inadequately raised in the original, supplmental, or amended application. While
the Idaho Supreme Court held in Evensiosky v. State, 136, Idaho 189, 191, 30
P.3d 967, 969 (2001) that there is no discovery exception to Idaho Code 19-4902,
and actual Brady violation would constitute an exception to this rule, creating
a basis for equitable tolling of the UPCPA's
such the Brady vioation is discoverd.
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one-year limitation period until

An actual Brady violation itself, by virtue of the state's misconduct,
equitably tolls the UPCPA's one year statute of limitation. Freshwater v. State,
160 S.W. 3d 548, 550 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2005) ("due process requires the tolling to
the statute of limitations for filing the petition for [post-conviction relief]
with respect to the petitioner's claim of previously withheld exculpatory
evidence"). The one-year statute of limitation, I.C.

§ 19-4902, runs from the

moment the Brady vioation is discovered.
c.

In This Post-Conviction Case, Tortolano Has Met His Burden Of Establishing
A Prima Facie Case Of A Violation Under Brady v. Maryland among others

The district court in its order granting the state's motion for summary
dismissal incorrectly held that Tortolano had not raised an issue which would
entitle him to relief and found the second successive petition failed to
demonstrate a reasonable or sufficient basis for not having raised or addressed
the matter in a prior post-conviction relief. (#41552, R., p.34.) However, in
support of his claims, Tortolano submitted an Affidavit of Fred Latham (#41552,

R., pp.8-11) demonstrating newly discovered evidence that goes to facts which he
did not have opportunity to otherwise learn of these particular facts other than
speaking with Mr. Latham, which counsel for Tortolano went so far as to properly
address the matter was timely, and based his argument on the Idaho Supreme Court's
holdings in Charboneau, v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2008). (#41552,
Tr., p.15, Ln.12-22.)
Charboneau was a successive petition for post-conviction relief, but one of
the underlying issues in that ruling was regarding the timeliness of a petition
being filed upon the state's misconduct where a Brady violation is asserted. Id.
114 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. Therein, Charboneau failed to demonstrate that
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he had failed to file his petition within a reasonable time, as he filed it thirteen
months after his awareness of undisclosed evidence. Id. 114 Idaho at 905, 174
P.3d 875. The circumstances in Mr. Tortolano's case provide stark contrast to the
occurrence in Charboneau. Tortolano filed his petition eleven (11) days after
learning of the evidence, and furthermore, he supported his filing with material
facts which were admissible material evidence and clearly demonstrated that this
was newly discovered evidence. (#41552, R., pp.8-11.)
i.

Tortolano Has Made A Showing, Through Admissible Evidence, That
The Withheld Testimony Was Exculpatory and Impeaching

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the United States Supreme
Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), the United
States Supreme Court clarified that "impeachment evidence ••• as well as exculpatory
evidence, falls within the Brady rule." The Supreme Court also clearly abandoned
the practice that a different standard of law should be applied depending upon
whether the defense had requested the information. Id. at 683 (disavowing
distinctions stated in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)).
The Bagley decision also clarified that "evidence is material only if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682. In other
words, a "'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id.
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In Kyles v. Wihitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), the United States Supreme
Court held that impeachment evidence known only to the police but unknown to the
prosecutor was subject to Brady disclosure. The Kyles Court also emphasized that
the Bagley materiality test requires the court to consider the suppressed evidence
"collectively, not item by item." Id. at 436. Particularly, the Kyles Court
explained:
[Courts] soould evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed
evidence item by item; there is no other way. We evaluate its cum.ilative effect
for purpcse of IIBteriality seµrrately and at the end of the discussion.

Id. at 436 n. 10. see also Gurbe v. Blades, 1:01-cv-357-BLW (Amended Memorandum
Order, Dkt. 113, 2/6/2006, D.Idaho).
The opinions of the Court designate the rights listed herein as "structural"
constitutional rights that are "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction
can never be treated as harmless error," or as so prone to prejudice, when
violated, that prejudice already has been proved or should be presumed. Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
The protection against prosecuorial suppression of excuplatory evidence
and other prosecutrial and judical failures to make "material" evidence or
witnesses available to the defense at trial, when "materiality" is defined as at
least a
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'reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result or the proceeding would have been different.'" Kyles, 514
U.S. at 435 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682); see also Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) in where the court held that evidentiary rulings depriving
defendant of access to evidence "critical to [his] defense" violates "traditional
and fundamental standards of due process". Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16
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(1967) holding that violation of Compulsory Process Clause when court arbitrarily
deprived defendant of "testimony [that] would have been relevant and material,
and ••• vital to the defense". Tortolano's documentary evidence, Fred Latham's
Affidavit, includes evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing.
a.

The Materiality Of The Withheld Evidence

The record in this case demonstrates that the respondent, in conjunction
with the police, suppressed evidentiary information that Tortolano presented
in his petition.
When the prosecution made the statement in its opening statement to the jury
that they would hear Fred Latham's testimony that Mr. Tortolano had told Mr. Latham
he was planing on killing Penny, it opened the door up for the right to compulsory
process to confront this witness. The respondent at trial did not produce this
witness. Yet, twelve jurors heard that Mr. Latham would testify to this and had
been made to believe it was a true statement until proven otherwise. Mr. Tortolano
was never given that opportunity
Further, Mr. Latham's Affidavit also demonstrates that the police were also
attempting to get Mr. Latham to provide false testimony. (#41552, R., pp.9-1O,
ff's 4-7, and 9.)

Thus, the only issue in the present case is whether there is

a reasonable probability that the disclosure of the materials would have affected
the outcome of the proceedings, i.e. whether they are sufficient to shake one's
confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.
Other facets of the Brady claim deserve mention. The state attempted to solicit
perjured testimony from Fred Latham, even though it was not used, and told the
jury that they would hear him testify that Tortolano told him that he planned on
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killing Penny. Fred Latham's Affidavit that Tortolano produced as part of his
petition (#41552, R., pp.8-11) also states that the police attempted to get him
to lie. Who is to say that the Detectives in this case who did testify at the trial
told the truth based upon how Detective Anderson attempted to get Latham to lie
and went so far as to harass him to do so. (#41552, R., p.9, para. 4) and then
the prosecution as well when they met with Latham in their attempts to get him
to lie. Id. at para. 6.
ii. Tortolano Had Demonstrated Evidence To Support An Evidentiary Hearing
Based upon the evidence that Tortolano presented in the second successive
petition was sufficient to support the allegations set forth in the petition.
Tortolano was only required to come forward with some evidence to prove his claims,
this was the Affidavit from Fred Latham. The district court at the motion to
dismiss hearing was not permitted to determine credibility issues, nor decide which
among conflicting pieces of evidence is to be be believed. Here, Tortolano produced
a Affidavit from Fred Latham to support his claims. Respondent produced nothing
and only "informed" the court she had to "go back and refresh

her

recollection"

as to the events complained of in the second successive petition. (#41552, Tr.,
p.13, Ln.1-5.) Not once did respondent in the district court proceedings in
the second successive petition file the underlying criminal record and transcripts,
or portions thereof, in order to set forth an affirmative defense or material
facts to support her position that Tortolano was not entitled to relief.
Based upon the genuine issue of material facts that were presented to the
district court by Tortolano, facts in dispute, required the district court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual issues. Kelly v. State,
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149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); McKay v. State, 149 Idaho 517,
225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010); DeRushe' v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148,
1152 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).
For these reasons this Court should vacate the district courts Order
granting the respondents motion to dismiss and remand the proceedings back with
instructions to conduct an evidenitiary hearing to resolve the disputes of
material issues of fact.
C.

Tortolano was deprived of effective assistance of counsel on collateral
review of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel claim presented
in the second successive petition for post-conviction relief that was
contrary to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.
1.

Facts pertaining to argument

Mr. Tortolano in a second successive petition for post-conviction relief
had presented a claim that his trial attorney's "failed to challenge the
prosecutors opening statement asserting that Fred Latham would be called to
provide incriminatingtestmony(sic), i.e., that the petitioner told Mr. Latham
taht he was planing on killing Penny." (#41552, R., pp.3-11, 5.)

This claim

was presented as newly discovered evidence, for Tortolano was not aware of the
facts pertaining to this claim until after he had an opportunity to speak with
Mr. Latham. (Id. at p.10.)
Respondent moved to dismiss the second successive petition by filing a motion
to dismiss in where she made an attempt to boot-strap the claims presented in the
second successive petition was nothing more than an attempt on Tortolano to the
first successive petition that was currently pending before the district court.
(Id. at pp.25-26.)
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The district court appionted conflict counsel for Tortolano, who then the
counsel of record in the first successive petition filed a substitution of conflict
counsel (Id. at pp. 24; 30-31.) counsel of record at no time filed any motions
to refute the motion to dismiss in the second successive petition that was
pending before the district court upon respondents motion to dismiss being filed.
(#41552, R., p.2.)
2.

Why relief should be granted

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[iJn
all prosectuions, the accused shall enjoy the right ••• to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o State shall ••• deprive person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
In this present case Torotolano's post-convcition counsel had not filed any
pleadings in the matter to defend, or let alone, prove that respondent was not
permitted the motion to dismiss. Counsel even informd the court that he had "not
filed anything with regard to these two particular cases", referring to the first
and second successive petition. (#41552, Tr., p.16, Ln.14-15.)
In respects to the second successive petition for post-conviction relief,
upon the respondent having filed the motion to dismiss (#41552, R., pp.25-26)
that did not contain the underlying criminal record, or portions of it, should
have filed an objection to respondents motion along with a motion to compel
respondent to produce the underlying record or portions thereof to support her
grounds that Tortolano did not produce newly discovered evidence.
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In the alternative, counsel for Tortolano was required to file a motion to
take judicial notice of the underlying criminal records and transcripts. Had this
been done it would have demonstrated to the district court that their was a material
issue of fact that was in dispute between Tortolano and the respondent and the
district court could have made a proper determination if the Affidavit of Fred
Latham was actually newly discovered evidence that would support that Tortolano's
trial attorney's were in fact ineffective for failing to challenge the
respondent's opening statement to the jury that Mr. Latham was going to testify
that Tortolano had planned to kill Penny. This demonstrates the cause and prejudice
prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Here, Tortolano was required to raise the claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel in the collateral proceeding, that being a post-conviction relief,
for defendants in a post-conviction proceeding are actually afforded greater
protection becuase the record can be properly developed regarding trial counsel's
performance. As explained in State v. Allen, 853 P.2d 625, 627 (Ct.App. 1993):
Typically, ineffective assistance of comsel claims challenge tre infonmtion
ca:rm.micated-or not ca:rm.micated-between tre defendant and his trial comsel,
as well as otrer aspects of tre attorney's performmce, treaties and strategies
prior to and during trial. Usually, tre trial record does not encanp9SS tre
facts surrounding such natters so as to allow adequate review of trial
trial counsel's performmce based solely on tre trial record.
Additionally, the issue of post-conviction relief counsel being ineffective
in respects to Tortolano's claim of his trial attorney's ineffectiveness is
properly set forth herein. This was addressed in Veenstra v. Smith, 2014 WL 1270626
March 26, 2014 (D.Idaho) B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, where he held that the
application of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) applies to situations such
as Tortolano's. Holding that Martinez applies in Idaho where the post-convcition
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setting was the first forum in which the ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim based on matters arising outside the record could have been brought and
developed in an evidentiary hearing. Id. at *11.
Further, the Court in Veenstra also held that his claim regarding inefective
assistance of post-conviction counsel was proper under the standard of review set
forth in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981), "sufficient reason"
since his case was decided prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
Murphy v. State, __ P.3d __ , 2014 WL 712695 (2014), review denied, July 1, 2014.
Veenstra, at *9, fn.3.
The district court in Tortolano's proceedings were decided prior to Murphy
and therefore Murphy should not apply to this case, and for the fact that newly
discovered evidence was presented that supports the claim of trial counsel's
failure to challenge the prosecutions opening statement to the jury that amounted
to prosecutorial misconduct.
a.

Trial Counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct
1.

Facts pertaining to argument

As previously set forth above, Tortolano has set forth newly discovered
evidence that his attorney's at trial failed to challenge, object, to the
prosecutions opening statement to the jury that Fred Latham would testify that
he planned to kill Penny.
2.

Why relief should be granted

It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial,
that only competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things, he
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of jurors, and tend
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to hinder them from considering only evidence introduced. State v. Philips, 144
Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct.App. 2007). The desire for success should never
induce the prosecutor to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything
except the evidence in the case. Id. Opening statements to the jury to gain the
attention of the jury and to enlighten the jury to what they will witness being
introduced in the course of the trial and interpret the evidence so as to render
a fair verdict.
Importantly, the deception of jurors by the presentation of known false
evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice. DeMarco v. United
States, 928 F.2d 1074, 1076 (llthCir. 1991). Thus, the state may not knowingly
use false evidence, including false testimony not produced, to obtain a conviction.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d
636 (2000). This standard applies not only to false evidence solicited by the
prosecution, but also to false evidence that the prosecution allows to go
uncorrected. Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9thCir. 1991); Sivak, 134 Idaho
641, 8 P.3d 636.
In relying on false testimony and misstating the evidence to the jury, the
prosecutor committed misconduct. Had trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's
statement, the court would have determined whether the challenged conduct
constituted misconduct and whether the error was harmless. See State v. Beebe,
145 Idaho 570, 574, 181 P.3d 496, 500; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 88, 156 P.3d at 589.
Because trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's misconduct, the trial
court did not have an opportunity to remedy the conduct's impact with a curative
instruction and any adverse ruling based on that objection could not be raised
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on direct appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Tortolano was prejudiced by trial counsel's
failure to object to the prosecutions opening statement to the jury. It is
unreasonable for counsel to not object to such a remark as that the prosecution
made in her opening statement to the jury, or let alone after the state rested
its case trial counsel could have at least attempted to call that witness, ,Fred
Latham, that she said would testify that Tortolano had told himheplanned tokill
Penny, or at the minimum in closing argument pointed out that the prosectuion
had made a statement of fact that was not true by not producing Mr. Latham to
testify and demonstrating reasonable doubt based upon such.
For the reasons set forth above, Tortolano has demonstrated that postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to properly present all matters in
respect to the newly discovered evidence, most importantly the fact that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutions opening
statement. As a result Tortolano was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance
and demostrated that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel in both
respects to trial counsel's failure to object to the opening statement made by
the prosecution, and by collateral review counsel being ineffective in failing
to preserve for further collateral review the matter regarding ineffectiveassistance-of-trial counsel matters regarding the newly discovered evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Tortolano respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's
order denying his second post-conviction relief and to remand this case to the
district court for further consideration in light of reasons set forth above,
and order that an evidentiary hearing take place to resolve the dispute of material

26

issues of fact. And, grant any further relief that justice may so permit.
Respectfully submitted OCTOBER __ , 2014.
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